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possible derivations from his ideas and the most recent theories of 
regulation of public utilities181. There is also a thread that from Pareto 
leads to Lerner, via Amoroso, and to Lerner’s famous index to 
measure market power, even if there is no proof of direct influence182. 
 
4. Why a history of the ideas on the causes of market power? 
Why is it important to follow up historically this notion of 
monopoly power? Which “arcane ideas” are revealed only if it is 
reconstructed by making use of this category? In other words, what 
makes the question we have raised a good historical question? We 
have several times stated that there are no studies on this subject: the 
suspicion may arise that if this history has not yet been written it is 
because it is  not important. We shall try to show why we think it is.  
1. We have already hinted at the possible derivation of the ideas of 
Sraffa as well as those of Sylos Labini and Modigliani from an Italian 
matrix: thanks to this category one might therefore write an Italian 
part of the history of the theory of non-competitive markets, which has 
not yet been written. We have also already mentioned possible 
influences of the Italian marginalists on the history of the thinking 
beyond their national borders and on later generations in 
environments akin to ours; research closely focused on the subject of 
the causes of market power may enable us to discover new lines of 
thought. So going back over the history employing this category 
allows us to find new derivations. 
2. Finding the causes of monopoly power is as useful as finding 
entry barriers. The reason why it is important to know the sources of 
market power is the same as why it is important to know what entry 
barriers are; both allow us to understand what causes prevent new 
firms from entering an industry. We know that the historiography has 
                                                 
181 Petretto (2002) does not trace the actual paths of the ideas, but offers useful hints on 
how to look for them. 
182 Keppler (1994b) attributes to Amoroso, a follower of Pareto, the formulation in 1930 
of an index similar to the one developed by Lerner four years later (597). 
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not dealt with the answers that were given to this question in the years 
before the studies of Bain and of Sylos Labini. Yet from the few 
mentions provided by the secondary literature reported here we have 
seen that in actual fact, from the marginalist age onwards there was a 
great deal of thinking on the question of entry. What was lacking 
therefore before Bain and Sylos Labini was only the treatment of entry 
in a model: it was only in the models, not in the theory, that this subject 
wasn’t considered183. So our study serves in the first place to avoid 
erasing from historical memory an entire chunk of theoretical 
thinking that is not mentioned in the history of the models, only 
because they are non-formalized theories. 
3. Thanks to the emerging of these theories, this category allows us 
to reject clearly and definitively the widespread idea that up until the 
Thirties in economic theory only the two extreme situations of perfect 
competition and monopoly were considered184. On the contrary, 
precisely because there wasn’t yet a fully worked out notion of perfect 
competition, the economists were well aware of the hybrid situations, 
and worked out theories to explain them. In the literature there are 
numerous, even if vague, references to this awareness; for example 
Chamberlin declares that his theory does not break with the past185; 
                                                 
183 Martin’s (2007) recognition of Marshall is significant on this: “There are many 
anticipations of the limit price model, including Marshall (1925/1890: 270): The leaders 
in the movement towards forming Trusts seem to be resolved to aim in the future at 
prices which will be not very tempting to any one who has not the economies which a 
large combination claims to derive … from its vast scale of business and its careful 
organization” (31). 
184 Joan Robinson states this (1933 [1969]: 3): “In the older text-books it was customary 
to set out upon the analysis of value from the point of view of perfect competition … 
But somewhere, in an isolated chapter, the analysis of monopoly had to be 
introduced” and adds: “the books never contained any very clear guidance as to how 
these intermediate cases should be treated”. Also Martin (2007) is of this opinion: “The 
mainstream price theory of the early twentieth century consisted of a theory of 
competitive markets and a theory of monopoly, with a vast wasteland in between” 
(27). Myatt and Hill (2003) argue on the other hand that still in the Forties textbooks 
were much less focused on perfect competition than they are today. 
185 “Although the idea has never been developed into a hybrid theory of value, it 
represents, so far, no departure from currently accepted doctrine” Chamberlin (1933 
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Galbraith describes the state of theory in the early Twenties in these 
terms: “Competition was not supposed perfect. Those who already 
operated in economic activity would have impeded access in various 
ways to new operators”186. And again, Schumpeter writes that 
Marshall considered pure competition and pure monopoly as limiting 
cases, and the hybrid ones as fundamental187. Our theoretical category 
of market power therefore enables us to quite clearly demonstrate that, 
even if not formalized in a model, a real theory of the situations in 
which firms have market power existed in fact.  
4. What was this theory? The notion of monopoly power allows us 
to show that the ideas of the marginalists on entry were mostly based 
on a theory that originated in adapting the classical theory of 
competition to the new situation: i.e. competition was for them still an 
activity, as for the classicals, but limited by more pervasive and more 
resistant obstacles when compared to those of the age of the classicals. 
To demonstrate this thesis is important, because it would disprove the 
idea, to which we have already referred, that the greater focus on 
situations of monopoly in the marginalist period was due only to a 
mutation of the theory. In essentials, the theory didn’t change, but the 
contextual situation did. 
5. Furthermore we wish to argue that the marginalist conception 
of competition has much more in common with the new industrial 
economics than with the theory of perfect competition188. For the 
recent theory competition consists of strategies adopted by asymmetric 
                                                                                                                    
[1962]: 66).  
186 Galbraith (1948 [1953]: 120).  
187 Schumpeter (1954 [1976]: 974-975). 
188 Referring to the underlying theory of competition, DiLorenzo and High (1988) state: 
“Economists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries … anticipated 
modern critics of antitrust law” (424). Blaug (1997) even goes so far as to establish a 
relation between classical theory and the present day one: “Producers in the Wealth of 
Nations treat price as a variable in accordance with the buoyancy of their sales, much 
like enterprises in modern theories of imperfect competition” (67). Petretto (2002) also 
confirms this thesis of ours for the case of De Viti de Marco.   
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firms with limited knowledge, which is a very different thing from the 
notion of perfect competition. One of our theses is that present day 
theory gave a formal appearance precisely to the conception of 
competition mainly adopted by the marginalists. 
6. The notion of entry barriers is important also for its implications 
for microeconomic policy. If there are causes of market power that 
bring about inefficiency, and it is not a short run phenomenon, then it 
is necessary to intervene189; and to identify these causes theory is 
required. The singling out of entry barriers is therefore the theoretical 
premise to the call for public intervention. And this was so even before 
Bain, even if the causes of monopoly power were not yet called “entry 
barriers”. In section 2.2 we argued that by looking at the  origins and 
development of antitrust legislation the history of the concept of 
market power cannot be found; however, this does not at all imply 
that it wasn’t developed with the aim of being applied. Especially as 
far as our four marginalists are concerned, we can be certain that they 
wrote to actually influence economic policy190. If, as we believe, there 
was a correspondence between the reform proposals put forward by 
the economists and the explanations they gave to the phenomenon of 
market power, then the marginalist age could have been the age 
when for the first time191, and not only in the USA, the ideas on the 
non-legal causes of market power made up the theoretical basis for 
the call for energetic competition policies. Our study therefore serves 
to provide the just recognition to those contributions that are not 
                                                 
189 On the recent tendencies of antitrust on this subject  Grillo (2006) writes critically: 
“Today, antitrust is greatly concerned with dynamic competition. The critical point is 
that incentives to innovative activity require some sort of ex-post monopoly. The need 
to foster ‘competition through innovation’, with its corollary of necessarily protecting 
monopoly, allegedly temporarily, is making its way in contemporary antitrust 
grounded as it is on dynamic ‘efficiency’ arguments, and this is setting new challenges 
to the received perspective” (47, author’s italics). 
190 Meacci (1998) “The call for reforms … is a prominent feature of the Italian 
tradition” (6).  
191 Since we saw that for the classicals the obstacles to competition weren’t really a 
problem. 
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mentioned in the histories of competition policies. 
 
 
 
 
 36
